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Abstract
Drawing on the SAGE minutes and other documents, I consider the wider lessons 
for norms of scientific advising that can be learned from the UK’s initial response to 
coronavirus in the period January–March 2020, when an initial strategy that planned 
to avoid total suppression of transmission was abruptly replaced by an aggressive 
suppression strategy. I introduce a distinction between “normatively light advice”, 
in which no specific policy option is recommended, and “normatively heavy advice” 
that does make an explicit recommendation. I argue that, although scientific advisers 
should avoid normatively heavy advice in normal times in order to facilitate demo-
cratic accountability, this norm can be permissibly overridden in situations of grave 
emergency. SAGE’s major mistake in early 2020 was not that of endorsing a par-
ticular strategy, nor that of being insufficiently precautionary, but that of relying too 
heavily on a specific set of “reasonable worst-case” planning assumptions. I formu-
late some proposals that assign a more circumscribed role to “worst-case” think-
ing in emergency planning. In an epilogue, I consider what the implications of my 
proposals would have been for the UK’s response to the “second wave” of late 2020.
Keywords Science and policy · Science and values · Scientific advice · COVID-19
1  Studying the table: science, policy and the role of philosophy 
of science
The COVID-19 pandemic has presented governments around the world with 
extraordinarily difficult decisions. Governments have generally sought to base these 
decisions on scientific advice, but there are many ways in which a decision can be 
“based on scientific advice”. My focus here is on the United Kingdom, and on the 
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UK’s initial response to COVID-19 in the early months of 2020. My aim is to ana-
lyse the advisory and decision-making process.1
I will not provide a detailed narrative account here,2 but I will set the scene 
briefly. On 13 January 2020, the UK government’s “New and Emerging Respira-
tory Virus Threats Advisory Group” (NERVTAG) held an “extraordinary meeting” 
to discuss a new pathogen: the “Wuhan novel coronavirus”, subsequently named 
SARS-CoV-2. Although the group considered the risk to the UK population to be 
“very low” (NERVTAG, 2020), the threat was considered serious enough to con-
vene the UK’s most important scientific advisory body, the “Scientific Advisory 
Group for Emergencies” (SAGE). On 22 January 2020, the first “precautionary” 
meeting of SAGE on the new coronavirus took place at 10 Victoria Street, London.
The severity of the threat, at this time, was extremely uncertain. The minutes 
note, optimistically, that “SAGE is unable to say at this stage whether it might be 
required to reconvene” (SAGE, 2020k). By the end of March 2020, SAGE had 
met twenty-one times—and the daily lives of everyone in the country had changed 
radically, partly as a result of its advice. The UK was in the grip of the first wave 
of a terrible epidemic. Official death counts would soon reach a 7-day average of 
over 900 per day (UK Government, 2021a). A national lockdown introduced on 23 
March had confined all but essential workers to their homes. SAGE itself could no 
longer meet in person and was meeting via Zoom.
The dramatic policy interventions of late March arrived at a time when infection 
was already widespread. On 2 March, a subgroup of SAGE (the “Scientific Pan-
demic Influence subgroup on Modelling”, SPI-M-O) had reported that “It is highly 
likely that there is sustained transmission of COVID-19 in the UK at present” (SPI-
M-O, 2020a). In the absence of mass testing, certainty was impossible—and SAGE 
had, in February, advised that mass testing would be unfeasible.3 But retrospective 
modelling now estimates that the cumulative number of COVID-19 infections in 
England was in the range 20–28,000 on 2 March (Birrell et  al., 2021). Levels of 
infection continued to grow exponentially throughout the first half of March, and 
the same modelling estimates that, by 23 March, between 1.9 and 2.3 million people 
had been infected. The chance to suppress transmission at a much earlier stage of the 
epidemic had been missed.
In analysing these events, what distinctive contribution can philosophy of science 
make? We are not a public inquiry; it is not our role to apportion blame or credit, to 
demand apologies, or to make recommendations that are specific to a single national 
1 In analysing this case, I have been particularly influenced by analyses of the interplay of science and 
values in other cases by Douglas (2009), Steele (2012), John (2015), Lewens (2019) and the contributors 
to Elliott and Richards (2017). Atkinson et al. (2020) have analysed the same events using different evi-
dence, namely interviews with panels of witnesses, and highlight some different issues: the appropriate 
mix of expertise, and the choice between centralized and decentralized responses. Cairney (2020, 2021) 
has analysed the same sequence of events from a political science perspective. To keep the present paper 
focused and concise, I will not include comparisons between my reflections and those of others.
2 For a good narrative account of the period under discussion here, see Grey and MacAskill (2020).
3 “It is not possible for the UK to accelerate diagnostic capability to include Covid-19 alongside regular 
flu testing in time for the onset of winter flu season 2020–21” (SAGE, 2020f).
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context. We are not journalists; it is not our role to tell gripping narratives. We have 
not been at the table when decisions are made, so we cannot offer first-hand reflec-
tions and insights. But one useful thing we can do is study the table. We can ana-
lyse, from a philosophical point of view, the dynamics of the relationship between 
government and advisor, and that between science and values, in unprecedented and 
dire circumstances, in the hope of extracting generalizable lessons. That is my pro-
ject here.
Why do this? I have three goals in view. One is to arrive at norms for effective 
scientific advising that may usefully generalize to other national contexts and to 
other major crises, including future pandemics. Another is to better understand how 
normal advising differs from advising in extremis, when the lives of a significant 
fraction of a country’s citizens are in immediate peril and there is no adequate pre-
existing plan or procedure for managing the risk. I will argue that there is a norma-
tive difference between these two contexts of scientific advising, and I aim to clarify 
the nature of the difference. A third is to better understand the relation between sci-
ence and values, and in particular the role that non-epistemic (ethical, social, politi-
cal) value judgements may legitimately play in scientific advising.
The process of scientific advising in the UK has been well documented, provid-
ing us with a rich set of resources on which to draw. SAGE ultimately met 74 times 
in 2020. Since late May 2020, the minutes have been made publicly available, usu-
ally within one month of the meeting. SAGE is represented on COBR (also known 
as Cobra), the UK’s primary decision-making body for civil contingencies, which is 
traditionally (but not always) chaired by the Prime Minister. Although minutes from 
COBR are classified, it is reasonable to assume that the SAGE minutes, along with 
other research papers and memos released by SAGE, reflect the scientific advice 
being provided to COBR at the time in question. A complication here is that, accord-
ing to the Prime Minister’s Chief Adviser at this time, Dominic Cummings, COBR 
was often bypassed in practice, with real decision-making occurring during informal 
meetings in 10 Downing Street (HSCC/STC, 2021, Q973-Q979). I will nonetheless 
assume that the SAGE minutes provide a fair account of the scientific advice feeding 
in to these informal meetings.
NERVTAG formally advises the Department of Health and Social Care, but 
throughout 2020 has collaborated closely with SAGE and has significantly overlap-
ping membership. This group met more than 40 times in 2020, and its minutes have 
also been made publicly available. SAGE also has two important subgroups: SPI-
M–O (Scientific Pandemic Influenza Group on Modelling, usually known by its ear-
lier name of SPI-M) and SPI-B (Scientific Pandemic Insights Group on Behaviour). 
While the minutes of these groups are not published, SPI-M-O has regularly pro-
duced "consensus statements" that are intended to convey to SAGE the consensus 
view within the group, and these are publicly available. A further source of evidence 
is public testimony to the Health and Social Care Select Committee and the Science 
and Technology Select Committee. I will be drawing here on all these sources, but 
with a special focus on the period January-March 2020.
The analysis that follows will be structured around two topics: (1) the distinct 
roles of “normatively heavy” and “normatively light” advice, and (2) the role of rea-
sonable worst-case scenarios in strategic planning. In each case, I will draw on the 
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available resources to highlight key features of the advisory process, leading me to 
propose generalizable norms for scientific advising in extremis. I will conclude with 
an epilogue that shifts the focus to September 2020 and considers whether my rec-
ommendations would have helped in that context.
2  Who makes the value judgements? Normatively heavy 
and normatively light advice
The slogan “advisers advise and ministers decide”, coined by Margaret Thatcher in 
1989, is a popular saying in UK government circles. The Chief Medical Officer dur-
ing the pandemic, Chris Whitty, has himself used it to describe how he sees the 
relationship between SAGE and government (HSCC, 2020, Q646). But what does 
it mean in practice? Should scientific advisers limit themselves to advising on what 
means would be effective in relation to which ends, without endorsing any particular 
course of action? Or should they issue imperatives that ministers can either follow 
or ignore?
Whichever form their advice takes, I take it there will be at least some non-epis-
temic (ethical, social, political) value judgements involved in formulating the advice. 
For example, the judgement about which options to mention in one’s advice, and 
which to omit, already involves a value judgement (see the many cases discussed by 
Douglas (2009), Steele (2012), Elliott and Richard (2017)). However, some value 
judgements are more momentous than others. A value judgement is momentous to 
the extent that decisions turn on it—to the extent that it changes the course of the 
pandemic response. Not all value judgements are like this. For example, a decision 
about whether or not to highlight a statement in bold font is a value judgement, but 
one that is usually non-momentous. Advisers can seek to avoid making momentous 
value judgements by adopting more circumspect forms of advice.
It will be helpful, for my purposes, to introduce a broad distinction between nor-
matively light and normatively heavy scientific advice. Normatively light advice 
declines to endorse any particular course of action, focussing instead on condition-
als and means-end relationships. It may take the form “If your goal is this, then this 
would be an effective means. If, on the other hand, your goal is this…” or the form 
“If you do this, then we expect this to happen…”.
An influential member of SAGE at the time, Neil Ferguson (Head of the Imperial 
College COVID-19 Response Team), gave a clear statement of a “normatively light” 
conception of SAGE’s role in his testimony to the Science and Technology Commit-
tee in March 2020:
To be clear, SAGE does not recommend policy. SAGE makes judgments about 
science, looking at scientific evidence, including about how rapidly the epi-
demic is moving and what the likely lethality is, and not recommendations 
about interventions but insights into what interventions might have what effect. 
(STSC, 2020a, Q9).
Normatively light advice is not free of value judgements, so it would be inap-
propriate to call it “non-normative”. For example, judgements are made regarding 
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which interventions are worthy of inclusion in the list of possibilities that are con-
sidered. However, the endorsement of any particular course of action is avoided, and 
the role of value judgements is minimized.
Normatively heavy advice takes the further step of endorsing a course of action 
and (at least implicitly) recommending against alternative courses. It may take the 
form: “Do one of these things” or simply “Do this.” Since a particular course of 
action is now being endorsed, there is an additional value judgement being made 
that is not present in normatively light advice.
This distinction is not sharp. As we will see, there are ways of formulating advice 
that blur the boundary between normatively light and normatively heavy. Nonethe-
less, the distinction is helpful for understanding what happened in the UK in early 
2020. When we look at the evidence, we see it is not correct that SAGE’s advice 
was entirely normatively light. SAGE’s advice was mostly normatively light dur-
ing January and February, with exceptions, before shifting to a normatively heavier 
approach on 5 March. There was then a major change around 16–18 March in the 
nature of the strategy SAGE endorsed.
3  Types of advice: analysing the evidence
3.1  The initial strategy
From the beginning, the SAGE minutes are in tension with Ferguson’s suggestion 
that SAGE “does not recommend policy”. At its 13 January extraordinary meeting, 
NERVTAG considered the idea of port-of-entry screening for symptoms, describing 
it as “not advised” (NERVTAG, 2020). In the context, to describe an action as “not 
advised” is to recommend against it. The SAGE minutes for 22 January affirm that 
“SAGE supports NERVTAG’s position … on the value of port screening” (SAGE, 
2020k). However, I see it as a reasonable generalization that SAGE’s advice is 
mostly normatively light until the end of February.
There is a draft paper, dated 26 February and discussed at a SAGE meeting on 27 
February 2020, that I take to capture the consensus view of SAGE at that moment 
(SAGE, 2020b). The paper presents various mitigation options, including social dis-
tancing (where people are instructed to remain a specified distance apart) and shield-
ing or “cocooning” (where clinically vulnerable people are instructed to self-isolate 
entirely), and various ways of combining them. The paper notes that "Implementing 
a subset of measures (e.g. the first three) would be expected to have a more moderate 
impact – still substantially reducing peak incidence, while making a second wave of 
infection in Autumn less likely. This might be the preferred outcome for the NHS." 
(SAGE, 2020b). The phrase “might be preferred” stops short of explicitly endorsing 
this course of action.
SAGE adds that “It is a political decision to consider whether it is preferable 
to enact stricter measures at first, lifting them gradually as required, or to start 
with fewer measures and add further measures if required" (SAGE, 2020b). This 
is striking because the decision in question is not purely political. The right deci-
sion depends in part on normative/evaluative considerations (How bad is it to 
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compromise civil and economic liberties more than is necessary? How bad is it to 
expose citizens to more risk than necessary?), but it also depends in part on epi-
demiological facts about the comparative effectiveness of initially strict measures 
which are then relaxed as opposed to initially lax measures which are then tightened.
When a judgement inherently involves evaluative/normative considerations, and 
yet also depends sensitively on scientific facts, I will call it a mixed judgement.4 Pan-
demics are by no means the only cases in which mixed judgements arise. However, 
the stakes in such a case are unusually high. These cases involve momentous mixed 
judgements, where the judgement either way is likely to affect the lives of millions 
of people in profound ways. One advantage of avoiding explicit recommendations, 
from the point of view of an adviser, is that it is a way of avoiding momentous 
mixed judgements. The “It is a political decision…” line is an instance of SAGE 
deliberately avoiding a momentous mixed judgement and instead handing it over to 
political leaders.
An updated draft, dated 4 March, included a comment that more explicitly adopts 
a normatively light approach: “SAGE has not provided a recommendation of which 
interventions, or package of interventions, that Government may choose to apply” 
(SAGE, 2020c). In the early days of the crisis, SAGE has already seen modelling 
results clearly showing the potential for a public health catastrophe, and has already 
seen evidence of community transmission of COVID-19 in the UK, but (in line with 
the earlier quotation from Ferguson) they have not yet made explicit recommenda-
tions. However, the paper also notes that SAGE will, on 5 March, consider the “opti-
mal combination of interventions”, the “optimal point to enact these interventions”, 
and the “duration that these interventions should be in place”.
The SAGE minutes for 5 March 2020 give us the results of these discussions. 
Here we find some very cautiously worded recommendations:
8. SAGE advised that the science supports a combination of case isolation and 
whole family isolation.
9. The science supports that a third intervention has epidemiological advan-
tages: to socially isolate those in vulnerable groups (the elderly and those with 
underlying conditions) approximately 2 weeks after these initial interventions.
10. If implemented in combination as modelled, this set of measures is under-
stood to most effectively delay and modify the epidemic peak, and reduce 
mortality. (SAGE, 2020i)
The phrase “the science supports” inhabits the borderline between normatively 
light and normatively heavy advice. It identifies a single course of action as “sup-
ported” without explicitly stating that it ought to be pursued. The most striking 
aspect of the recommendation to my eye is that no other interventions (such as 
social distancing, border closures, business closures, school closures, transport clo-
sures or mask wearing) are recommended at this time.
4 This term is inspired by Plutynski’s (2017) discussion of mixed judgements in cancer screening and 
Alexandrova’s (2018) discussion of mixed claims in the science of well-being.
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These recommendations were reflected in an updated draft paper dated 9 March 
and discussed on 10 March (SAGE, 2020d). The comment about “implementing a 
subset of measures” is now modified to include an explicit endorsement: "A combi-
nation of these measures is expected to have a greater impact: implementing a sub-
set of measures would be ideal. Whilst this would have a more moderate impact it 
would be much less likely to result in a second wave” (SAGE, 2020d, italics added). 
In context, this amounts to recommending against implementing the full set of meas-
ures considered.
3.2  Reasons for the initial strategy
What was the reasoning here? In these documents (the 5 March minutes, 9 March 
paper and the 10 March minutes), we see that SAGE made a controversial and fate-
ful choice: the choice to advise against a course of action that might lead to a second 
wave later in the year by suppressing transmission too aggressively in the short term. 
What SAGE initially endorsed was not a strategy of maximally aggressive suppres-
sion: it endorsed implementation of a “subset” of the measures considered. The 
prevailing view at this time was that the costs of maximally aggressive suppression 
would exceed the benefits, because suppressing transmission completely would lead 
to a catastrophic, unmitigated epidemic when the measures were relaxed.
This received wisdom is captured by a sketch of a graph in the 4 March and 9 
March draft papers, which appears designed to illustrate the superiority of “high 
transmission reduction” over “very high transmission reduction, later lifted” (Fig. 1). 
Fig. 1  A sketch of a graph from SAGE (2020d), dated 9 March 2020. The “high transmission reduction” 
line depicts a strategy in which herd immunity is achieved by the summer through natural infection. The 
“very high transmission reduction” line depicts a strategy in which aggressive suppression in the spring 
leads to a disastrous wave of infection in the autumn, again leading to herd immunity through natural 
infection
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At the time, SAGE was perceived by its critics to be following a “herd immunity 
strategy”, whereas the Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir Patrick Vallance, vehemently 
denied that there was any such strategy in private emails subsequently released to 
the BBC (Kermani, 2020). We can see that the recommended strategy between 5 
and 16 March was a “high transmission reduction strategy” that aimed to flatten the 
curve without suppressing it completely. This is a strategy in which herd immunity 
is achieved and is the means by which a second peak is avoided. The resistance to 
the term “herd immunity strategy” is understandable, but nonetheless the achieve-
ment of herd immunity through widespread infection was a central component of the 
initial strategy.
To understand the underlying rationale for this advice, we need to understand a 
piece of conventional epidemiological wisdom: “flatter” epidemics spread out over 
a longer period are, in theory, less severe than fast epidemics with sharp peaks, both 
because the healthcare system is less overstretched at any given time and because 
the total number of people infected is likely to be lower.5 A second important point 
is that healthcare demand is normally much greater in the autumn and winter than in 
the summer, and SAGE believed peak healthcare demand would be reduced by guid-
ing the peak towards summer. Vallance gave a rationale along these lines in his press 
briefing of 12 March (10 Downing Street, 2020), and SAGE member John Edmunds 
gave a similar rationale in a media interview on 13 March (Channel 4 News, 2020, 
9:50–23:45).
Note that this line of thought only makes sense if we make a variety of pessimis-
tic background assumptions, including that vaccines will not become available soon 
enough and that long-term behavioural changes will not be instilled. These pessi-
mistic assumptions will be interrogated later, in Sects. 5 and 6.
3.3  The sudden change of strategy
A major change of approach becomes evident in the published material on 16 
March. On that day, SAGE discusses several new modelling papers, including one 
from the Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team (Ferguson et al., 2020). This 
paper explicitly contrasts mitigation strategies that aim not to suppress transmission 
completely (i.e. the type of strategy endorsed by SAGE in the 9 March paper) with 
a strategy of maximally aggressive suppression, including school closures, show-
ing that the second type of strategy has the potential to lead to far fewer deaths. 
The paper contains the line: "We therefore conclude that epidemic suppression is the 
only viable strategy at the current time" (Ferguson et al., 2020).
For some time, models discussed by SAGE had been showing that, without maxi-
mally aggressive suppression, the demand on critical care beds would be enormous. 
5 See Handel et al. (2007) for an explanation of this second reason. To explain intuitively: once a critical 
number of infections is reached, natural herd immunity is achieved and the number of daily new infec-
tions starts to fall. But the daily total falls gradually, and the total number of infections in the epidemic 
depends on the height from which the daily total has to fall. Higher peaks take longer to descend from, 
leading to higher total numbers of infections.
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SAGE had already written on 26 February that “In the reasonable worst-case sce-
nario, demand on beds is likely to overtake supply well before the peak is reached” 
(SAGE, 2020b). This was not news, to SAGE, on 16 March. But prior to 16 March, 
the prevailing view nonetheless opposed maximally aggressive suppression, for the 
reasons noted above.
So what was the news on 16 March? For one thing, reliable data about critical 
care capacity was plotted on the same graph as “reasonable worst-case scenario” 
projections regarding demand for critical care, revealing the enormous size of the 
mismatch (Fig. 2). Even with mitigation measures in place, the Imperial model pro-
jected that demand, in a reasonable worst-case scenario, would exceed supply by at 
least a factor of eight. It is possible that other SAGE members, although well aware 
that “demand on beds is likely to overtake supply well before the peak is reached”, 
had not fully appreciated the size of the mismatch. A slide presented by Vallance in 
a public briefing on 12 March offered a much more optimistic view on which there 
was no mismatch at all (10 Downing Street, 2020, March). Nonetheless, I still find 
this an unconvincing explanation for the change of approach.
A better explanation, to my eye, appeals to the idea that new policy options came 
into view—options that had previously been seen as too radical to merit serious con-
sideration. The strategy Ferguson et al. endorse involves not just short-term school 
closures, but regular, sustained school closures until a vaccine or effective treatment 
is implemented or until herd immunity is achieved. The projection is that school 
closures will be needed again whenever cases start to rise sharply, and that this will 
have to be done for roughly two thirds of the time for at least 18 months (Fig. 3).
Prior to 16 March, I can find no concrete evidence of this having been consid-
ered by SAGE as a realistic possibility. The expectation was that measures would be 
Fig. 2  Projected demand for critical care and critical care capacity, from Ferguson et al. (2020). The pro-
jections indicate that, without aggressive suppression measures such as school closures, demand for criti-
cal care would exceed supply many times over
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one-shot, time-limited (for a period of at least 8 and at most 13–17 weeks, depend-
ing on the measure), and that the epidemic would return when they were lifted. The 
new possibility, which Imperial now describes as the only viable option, involves 
a level of sustained school closure that was previously off the table. According to 
Cummings, an option of this type was discussed informally on the evening of 13 
March (HSCC/STC, 2021, Q1003), but to my knowledge its first appearance in pub-
lished official documents is in the Imperial paper dated 16 March.
The Ferguson et  al. paper therefore made (in a rather discreet way) some truly 
momentous mixed judgements. There was a value judgement involved in regarding 
sustained school closure as a live option worth modelling at all, but the most signifi-
cant value judgement was to regard that option as so clearly preferable to an over-
whelmed healthcare system, given the model projections, that it was the only viable 
option, implying an urgent normative imperative to pursue it.
The Imperial paper directly informed the advice given by SPI-M–O to SAGE 16 
March, in which SPI-M–O reported:
It was agreed that the addition of both general social distancing and school 
closures to case isolation, household isolation and social distancing of vulner-
able groups would be likely to control the epidemic when kept in place for a 
long period. SPI-M-O agreed that this strategy should be followed as soon as 
practical, at least in the first instance. (SPI-M-O, 2020b, italics added)
This is another example of normatively heavy advice. It is an endorsement of Fer-
guson and colleagues’ recommendation.
Fig. 3  A graph from Ferguson et al. (2020), in which the blue-outlined blocks represent periods of school 
closure. This is a projection of the consequences of closing schools for about two thirds of the time, 
indefinitely, until a vaccine is developed
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SAGE itself, at this moment, continued to prefer more circumspect advice. The 
minutes of the 16 March meeting record that “SAGE advises that there is clear 
evidence to support additional social distancing measures be introduced as soon 
as possible." (SAGE, 2020e, italics added). The nature of the additional measures 
was left open, and school closures were not yet recommended. Two days later, this 
changed. On 18 March, SAGE advised that “available evidence now supports imple-
menting school closures on a national level, as soon as practicable to prevent NHS 
intensive care capacity being exceeded” (SAGE, 2020l).
As on 5 March, the language of what the science or evidence “supports” leaves 
some room for debate about whether this was an explicit recommendation, since it 
does not explicitly say what the government ought to do or should do. Nonetheless, 
it is clear in the context that a specific course of action was endorsed. The recom-
mendation was followed, and schools closed on 20 March.
4  Types of advice: reflections and a proposal
What can we learn from this case? My interest here is in generalizable norms for 
scientific advising in extremis. When I say “in extremis”, I mean that the situation is 
one in which the lives of a significant fraction of a country’s citizens are in immedi-
ate peril and no pre-existing plan or procedure exists for managing the risk.6 Given 
the way I have defined “in extremis”, it is clear that, ideally, countries will never find 
themselves in extremis, because they will have pre-agreed plans and procedures for 
managing major risks. So our project here is one of constructing norms for effective 
scientific advising in a far-from-ideal situation.
One important reference point for this type of problem is Michael Walzer’s work 
on the “problem of dirty hands” (Walzer, 1973, 1977, 2004). Walzer argues that 
there is a normative difference between political leadership in normal times and 
political leadership in extremis, or, to use his preferred term, “supreme emergency”. 
In normal times, a political leader should adhere to the ordinary moral norms of 
the community they lead. But in extremis, when the moral community itself is in 
immediate peril, those norms can be permissibly overridden. A political leader may 
violate the ordinary moral norms of the community in order to avoid catastrophe. 
For example, perhaps a leader could permissibly divert enemy bombing away from 
strategically important city centres on to working class residential areas, as the UK 
did in World War Two (Burri, 2020).
I want to make a Walzer-inspired point in relation to scientific advising. I suggest 
that the norms of scientific advising in normal times, though present for good rea-
sons, can sometimes be permissibly overridden in extremis. In particular: there are 
good reasons for advisers to avoid normatively heavy advice in normal times, but in 
extremis this type of advice can be appropriate—and I contend that the “aggressive 
6 I don’t think precise thresholds for “significant” or “immediate” are possible. These facts may be 
sources of debate. I do think COVID-19 unambiguously presented the UK with a threat of this type.
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suppression now” recommendation of 16–18 March is an example of normatively 
heavy yet appropriate advice.
Why is normatively heavy scientific advice inappropriate in normal times? It is 
inappropriate because it violates norms of accountability. A decision is democrati-
cally accountable if the person who made it can be held to account for it by the pub-
lic. Holding a decision-maker to account can take many forms, but typically involves 
compelling them to give a public account of the reasons for their decisions and to 
respond to challenges, and it also involves the threat of democratic consequences 
(such as electoral defeat or removal from office) if their account reveals a mismatch 
between their reasons and the values of the voters. Accountability is widely taken to 
be an important norm of decision-making in democratic societies.7
A structure in which advisers make a single, normatively heavy recommendation, 
to be followed or rejected by decision-makers, leads to a problem of accountability. 
In making normatively heavy advice, scientific advisers claim for themselves the 
ability to make momentous mixed judgements that include a substantial evaluative 
component, such as the judgement that healthcare system collapse is normatively 
worse than prolonged school closures. The advisers are not representatives and are 
not subject to the possibility of democratic consequences, and there is no particular 
reason to think the advisers’ value judgements will reflect the values of voters. This 
leads to the concern that there is insufficient accountability for these momentous 
judgements.
Ministers, meanwhile, having in effect outsourced the task of weighing conflict-
ing values (such as the value of public health and education) to their advisers, find 
themselves in a position in which the only public rationale they can give for their 
decisions is: “I trusted my advisers and accepted their recommendation” (or sim-
ply, “I followed the science”). The ministers can be praised or blamed for trusting 
their advisers, but the underlying normative reasons and values that led to the deci-
sion will not be properly accounted for or subjected to democratic acceptance or 
rejection.
We can describe the resultant situation as an accountability gap: no one is prop-
erly democratically accountable for value judgements that shape people’s lives in 
dramatic and long-lasting ways. In such a situation, there is the potential for policy 
responses to emergencies to float free of what a fully informed citizenry would actu-
ally support, if the decisions were put directly to them.
I see this concern about accountability as a serious one, and one that would prob-
ably win the day in normal times. In normal times, it provides a good reason for 
scientific advisers to limit themselves to normatively light advice in which no spe-
cific policy option is endorsed. Yet I do not see this as a necessarily decisive reason 
to avoid normatively heavy advice, and I think it does not always win the day in 
extremis.
7 See Pitkin (1967) for an influential discussion of norms of accountability. For more recent discussions, 
see Grant and Keohane (2005), Mansbridge (2009). For an argument that accountability is not an essen-
tial feature of democracy, only a desirable one, see Landemore (2020).
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What is different about advice in extremis? A piece of scientific advice can be 
considered abstractly as a signal sent by an adviser to a decision-maker that influ-
ences their actions. As with any signalling system, the sender does not have full 
control over how the receiver will react. Their signal merely shifts the probabili-
ties of different actions. Moreover, there will be noise in the channel—misun-
derstandings are possible. In this context, different types of signal are not all on 
a par in terms of their influence. A clear imperative signal–Do X now!—is much 
more likely to produce a specific action X than a complex description of possible 
actions and their likely consequences. In normal times, I take it that the impera-
tive to avoid accountability gaps is generally more important than the imperative 
to elicit a specific policy response. In extremis, this situation can sometimes be 
reversed.
To put the point more precisely, my contention is that there can be circum-
stances in which:
a) An adviser reaches the justified conclusion that a specific action, X, is the best 
available way to avert a normatively terrible outcome, O;
b) Providing political leaders with a normatively light presentation of various alter-
natives, with X among them, would not reliably lead to X being implemented;
c) O would be sufficiently catastrophic for the whole of society that the imperative 
to reliably bring about X overrides any other obligations the adviser normally has, 
such as the obligation to facilitate democratically accountable decision-making.
In such a situation, I contend that the adviser faces an analogue of the type 
of situation Walzer described as a “dirty hands” situation. Their normal obliga-
tions are overridden by an exceptionally pressing need to elicit a specific pol-
icy response. I also contend that the advisers who first realized, on or around 
16 March 2020, that immediate school closures and other strong measures (such 
as general social distancing) were the only credible means of averting an over-
whelmed healthcare system were in the type of situation just described.
One might agree that the general type of situation characterised by (a)–(c) could 
happen and yet disagree that the events of mid-March are a genuine instance of it. 
Critics of the Ferguson et  al. model have argued that, due to the tentative nature 
of its modelling assumptions, it did not generate a normatively adequate justifica-
tion for its recommendation (Northcott, 2021; Winsberg et  al., 2020; but see also 
the response from van Basshuysen and White,  2021). Importantly, though, we 
should avoid overstating the significance to the case of this one model. As we have 
seen, SAGE had held since late February that “in a reasonable worst-case scenario, 
demand on beds is likely to overtake supply well before the peak is reached”. Many 
different models, plus news reports from Lombardy and Wuhan, supported this 
claim. In the context, the main contribution of the 16 March Ferguson et al. model 
was to bring into view a policy option (“suppression”) that, in the model, averts that 
outcome by means of indefinitely sustained, repeated periods of school closure.
The normative justification for this policy option was that it could realisti-
cally avert the disaster that a reasonable worst-case scenario would (as a matter of 
 European Journal for Philosophy of Science           (2021) 11:90 
1 3
  90  Page 14 of 27
consensus) bring, and it was the only live policy option that could do so. The role 
of the model within the wider case was to show the insufficiency, given a set of 
intentionally pessimistic planning assumptions, of less interventionist approaches 
and the potential adequacy of a set of interventions including school closures and 
general social distancing.
If we grant that the advisers on SPI-M-O were indeed justified in concluding, on 
16 March, that a suppression strategy was justified, how should they have communi-
cated their advice? In normal times, they should have tried to enable accountability 
by laying out different options for decision-makers along with projections of their 
likely consequences, without endorsement. But this was a situation of grave emer-
gency in which conditions (b) and (c) were also satisfied. There was no strong reason 
to think decision-makers would reliably make the same mixed judgements given the 
same modelling and data. Misunderstandings were likely. There was some reason to 
suspect decision-makers would resist a dramatic, sudden change of strategy—since 
any political leader will be averse to U-turns that undermine public confidence in 
their grip of the situation. And the situation was sufficiently dire to override norms 
of accountability, since hundreds of thousands of lives were in the balance.
That leads me to my first proposal: I suggest that the norm against accountabil-
ity gaps, although reasonable in normal times, can sometimes be appropriately sus-
pended in extremis. Some accountability gaps may be tolerated. Scientific advis-
ers may permissibly make normatively heavy recommendations, including simple, 
unambiguous imperatives to implement a specific policy option, where they have a 
justified belief that this option is the only robust way to avert a catastrophic outcome.
One might object that SAGE was rather too willing to endorse a specific policy 
option on 5 March, namely the “high transmission reduction” option—believing it, 
at the time, to be the only available means of averting an even worse disaster than 
short-term healthcare system collapse. Had this belief been justified (i.e. condition 
a), then according to my proposal they were justified in making that recommenda-
tion—since conditions (b) and (c) were plausibly also satisfied. This may lead to 
some unease about my proposal. However, I do not think their belief was justified. 
It was the result of an impoverished set of policy options, based on the constraints 
imposed by a particular set of planning assumptions. Those assumptions will be the 
focus of the next section.
5  Reasonable worst‑case scenarios: analysing the evidence
I have sometimes heard it suggested that SAGE’s approach to the pandemic was not 
“precautionary” enough—not sufficiently concerned with avoiding the worst-case 
outcome. The SAGE minutes show this to be too simplistic. As we have seen, a con-
cern with preventing what they saw as a reasonable worst-case outcome, in which 
excessive intervention in the spring led to a disastrous second wave in the autumn, 
was the guiding principle behind SAGE’s advice during an important period in late 
February and early March. In this section, I want to zoom in on the role played by 
this reasoning about the “reasonable worst-case scenario” (RWCS).
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5.1  The concept of a reasonable worst‑case scenario (RWCS)
The concept of a “reasonable worst-case scenario” (RWCS) has been at the core 
of SAGE’s approach to the pandemic from the beginning. An RWCS is a set of 
assumptions that reflect one way in which the epidemic in the UK may unfold. The 
set of assumptions is “reasonable” in the sense of being regarded by SAGE as a seri-
ous possibility. It is “worst-case” in the sense of being at the pessimistic end of the 
range of serious possibilities.
The RWCS concept has been prominent in civil contingencies planning in the UK 
since at least 2009, when it played an important role in the response to the H1N1 
(“swine flu”) pandemic. A succinct explanation of the concept was presented by 
SAGE to the Science and Technology Select Committee in 2010:
The reasonable worst case is a concept developed for emergency planning in 
the UK. This concept is designed to exclude theoretically possible scenarios, 
which have so little probability of occurring that planning for them would 
lead to a disproportionate use of resources. They are not predictions of what 
will happen but of the worst that might realistically happen, and therefore we 
would expect most pandemics to be less severe and less widespread than the 
reasonable worst case. By planning for the reasonable worst case planners are 
assured that they have a high probability of meeting the demands posed by the 
hazard should it occur. (STSC, 2010, Appendix A)
There are two broad rationales for taking a particular interest in the RWCS. One 
is the idea that, if you plan for the RWCS, you will also be well prepared for less 
severe scenarios. Planning for the reasonable worst-case is thus assumed to be a 
way of robustly preparing for a wide range of scenarios. The other rationale is the 
idea that, in a situation of uncertainty, giving special weight to the RWCS in deci-
sion-making is normatively justified by an imperative to avoid the worst possible 
outcomes.8 The above paragraph suggests the first rationale has traditionally driven 
SAGE’s interest in the RWCS. However, the recommendations made by SAGE, and 
the importance to those recommendations of avoiding a disastrous second wave in 
the autumn, suggest that the second role also played at least an implicit role in their 
deliberations.
5.2  The initial RWCS
What was the RWCS, in the UK’s initial response to COVID-19? It was, in some 
respects, highly pessimistic. SAGE’s RWCS planning assumptions, adapted from 
an existing RWCS for pandemic influenza, set out a scenario in which 80% of the 
population is infected over a period of about nine weeks, with 50% displaying symp-
toms, and an infection fatality rate (IFR) of 1%. The result would have been around 
8 This informal idea can be formalized in different ways by various decision-theoretic rules. See Voorho-
eve (forthcoming) for an introduction to the decision-theoretic treatment of uncertainty.
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520,000 excess deaths within three months. In a draft dated 4 March 2020 (SAGE, 
2020n), it was also explicitly assumed that no effective treatments or vaccines will 
become available either before or during the epidemic. This line was deleted from 
the version dated 6 March (SAGE, 2020o), but seemed to tacitly guide strategic 
planning.
SAGE also made some highly pessimistic background assumptions that, although 
not formally part of the RWCS planning assumptions, are important for understand-
ing the advice given at this time. First, SAGE was initially pessimistic about the 
prospects for mass testing or contact tracing (where the contacts of infected indi-
viduals are tracked down and instructed to self-isolate). The minutes of 18 February 
state that “when there is sustained transmission in the UK, contact tracing will no 
longer be useful” (SAGE,  2020j). Second, SAGE initially assumed that interven-
tions (such as social distancing and shielding or “cocooning”) would be one-shot 
interventions for a period of 13–17 weeks. Some modelling was done of a scenario 
in which they are sustained for 26 weeks, but 13–17 weeks was the assumption in 
SAGE’s written advice. Third, SAGE assumed partial compliance. For example, it 
assumed that 50% would comply with household quarantine. SAGE described this 
50% level of compliance as “high levels of compliance” and warned that such a level 
of compliance “may be unachievable in the UK population” (SAGE, 2020c).
There was also pessimism about the ability of the healthcare system to cope 
with demand in the RWCS, regardless of the interventions taken. There is a line in 
SAGE’s 26 February draft advice that says “in the event of a severe epidemic, with-
out action, the NHS will be unable to meet all demands placed on it. In the reason-
able worst case scenario, demand for beds is likely to overtake supply well before 
the peak is reached” (SAGE, 2020b). The words “without action” were deleted 
between the 26 February draft and the 3 March draft (SAGE, 2020c), presumably to 
take account of the new modelling that had become available on 2 March. The new 
modelling suggested that “without action” was misleading, since none of the actions 
being considered at that time would be enough to prevent demand for healthcare 
outstripping supply.
Yet in other respects, the RWCS assumptions were surprisingly optimistic. SAGE 
(in the 4 March draft) assumed that  R0, the basic reproductive rate of the virus in the 
absence of mitigation, was 2.4, leading to a doubling time of 4–6 days. Estimates 
varied a great deal at the time, and still do, but this was, even then, towards the 
lower end of serious estimates for  R0. A study published in The Lancet on 31 Janu-
ary had estimated  R0 at 2.7 (Wu et al., 2020). On 11 February, researchers at the 
Theoretical Biology and Biophysics unit at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, 
USA, released a preprint estimating that  R0 was between 4.7 and 6.6 (Sanche et al., 
2020). SAGE’s line about  R0 was deleted in the 6 March draft, in which no estimate 
of  R0 was included.
There was also another optimistic background assumption, introduced on 25 Feb-
ruary, that surveillance “should provide evidence of an epidemic around 9–11 weeks 
before its peak” (SAGE, 2020g). Just as  R0 being higher than expected was not 
part of the RWCS, surveillance being poorer than expected was also not part of the 
RWCS. In short, the RWCS assumptions were a mix of bleak pessimism and exces-
sive optimism.
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5.3  Consequences
What were the consequences of these choices? The costly delays between 2 and 
23 March can be seen as consequences of planning assumptions made around the 
beginning of this period. The combination of an optimistic estimate for  R0, opti-
mism about surveillance, and an assumption that 13–17  weeks was the realistic 
maximum duration for interventions, made it seem optimal to delay the introduction 
of social-behavioural interventions that were in fact urgently needed.
This problem was compounded by continued scepticism, up to at least 16 March, 
about the idea of maximally aggressive suppression. As we have seen, between 5 
and 16 March, SAGE’s advice was explicitly against maximally aggressive sup-
pression and in favour of more moderate measures. This initially sceptical attitude 
towards maximally aggressive suppression can also be traced to the RWCS plan-
ning assumptions. In a reasonable worst-case, no effective treatment, contact tracing 
system or vaccine becomes available before measures are relaxed, and no long-term 
behavioural changes are instilled, so total suppression leads inevitably to the epi-
demic returning with unmitigated force in the autumn, infecting 80% of the popula-
tion and overwhelming the health service. This corresponds to the “very high trans-
mission reduction” line in Fig. 1. In that bleak scenario, we come to bitterly regret 
the aggressive measures adopted in the spring.
A defender of SAGE’s initial strategy might object: the UK did indeed endure 
a dreadful wave (or pair of waves, if we count the emergence of the Alpha variant 
as a new wave) in the autumn/winter of 2020–21, just as the “very high transmis-
sion reduction” line projects. On 1 September 2020, the official death toll (based 
on deaths within 28 days of a positive COVID-19 test) stood at 41,650. By 1 March 
2021, it had risen to 124,288 (UK Government, 2021a). So, can we be sure the ini-
tial strategy was a mistake?
Note, however, that the autumn/winter epidemic was far from sufficient to achieve 
herd immunity through natural infection. This can be clearly seen from the emer-
gence of a new wave (i.e. a third or fourth wave, depending on how one counts 
waves) in summer 2021, despite a large-scale vaccination programme (UK Government, 
2021b). Had the epidemic been allowed to grow unsuppressed to the level of natural 
herd immunity without vaccination, as per the initial strategy, it would have grown 
much larger than the actual epidemic of autumn–winter 2021. Since the logic of the 
initial strategy was to tolerate a vast wave in the summer to prevent an even worse 
one the following winter, the smaller wave that actually occurred does not provide a 
retrospective vindication of the initial strategy. It is never easy to evaluate counter-
factuals, but I think we have good evidence that the initial strategy would have led to 
disastrous results, had it not been abandoned.
6  Reasonable worst‑case scenarios: reflections and proposals
Let us return to one of the underlying principles apparently guiding the use of 
RWCSs: if you assume you are in the RWCS, and plan accordingly, then you will 
be as well prepared as possible for less severe scenarios. I will call this the RWCS 
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principle. This case, I suggest, shows us some important exceptions to the RWCS 
principle.
One problem with the RWCS principle arises when the RWCS is pessimistic in 
most relevant respects but not all of them. I will introduce the term “globally pes-
simistic scenario” for a scenario that is at the pessimistic end of scientific opinion 
regarding all of its planning assumptions, not just some. To be clear, these assump-
tions should still be at the population level, and may still include estimates of statis-
tical variables. Clearly, we should not think: any individual could die from COVID-
19, so the globally pessimistic scenario should include a 100% fatality rate. Instead, 
we should take the most pessimistic but still scientifically serious estimates of each 
statistical variable. SAGE’s RWCS was not globally pessimistic in this sense. It was 
in some respects optimistic. When the RWCS is not globally pessimistic, there is a 
serious risk that reality will be worse than the RWCS in those specific respects. This 
is what happened in relation to R, which was almost certainly above 2.4 before the 
spring lockdown in England, according to retrospective modelling, despite substan-
tial attempts at mitigation (Birrell et al., 2021).
This leads me to a proposal: the globally pessimistic scenario should be used in 
preference to an RWCS when what is desired is a general indication of how bad 
things could, in principle, become. However, the nature of this role calls for fur-
ther reflection, since it would be clearly unwise to let the globally pessimistic sce-
nario dominate strategic planning. After all, the globally pessimistic scenario may 
well be extremely unlikely. To illustrate: the globally pessimistic scenario would be 
one in which compliance with behavioural interventions is poor (well below 50%), 
so allowing the globally pessimistic scenario to dominate planning would lead to 
unjustified scepticism about such interventions. There will be some contexts in 
which being aware of the globally pessimistic scenario may well be useful for spe-
cific decisions (e.g. when deciding how much of a given item of personal protective 
equipment to order, or when deciding how large to make emergency hospital wards) 
but it would be a clear mistake to premise all planning on a very low probability 
scenario.
A different problem with the RWCS principle is that there can be circumstances 
in which assuming you are in an RWCS justifies actions, delays, or omissions that 
will impair your response significantly if you are in a less severe scenario. For exam-
ple, it makes sense to say that, in a reasonable worst case, no effective treatment or 
vaccine will become available, contact tracing will never become effective, and no 
long-term behavioural changes will be instilled, even if you delay the epidemic by 
several months. In this case, maximally aggressive suppression of transmission is 
likely to make things worse in the long run, as vividly shown in Fig. 1. It is better 
not to try it. But suppose you are in fact in a less severe scenario, in which one of 
these three pessimistic assumptions is false. In such a scenario, maximally aggres-
sive suppression is likely to be far superior to more moderate action, in terms of 
both its public health consequences and its long-term economic consequences. So, 
if you plan for the RWCS, and adopt a strategy that involves aiming for the “high 
transmission reduction” line in Fig. 1, you in fact commit to a strategy that could 
lead to serious regret, if it subsequently transpires that vaccines, long-term behav-
ioural change and/or contact tracing are more feasible than initially assumed.
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To be clear, this second problem does not stem from the excessive optimism of 
some elements of the RWCS. Had SAGE’s planning scenario been globally pessi-
mistic, this problem would still have arisen. It arises from over-reliance on a single 
set of planning assumptions. The basic problem is that, in a pandemic, less severe 
scenarios are not just scenarios in which all the same measures are needed, but a lit-
tle less urgently or to a lesser degree. They can be scenarios in which a qualitatively 
different strategy is appropriate.
This leads me to another proposal concerning the use of RWCSs. Neither glob-
ally pessimistic scenarios nor RWCSs should be allowed to dominate strategic plan-
ning. For strategic planning, it is important to consider a wide range of possible 
scenarios and to avoid reliance on the principle that preparing for the RWCS will 
avert disaster in less severe scenarios. The apparent inevitability of a large wave as 
soon as measures were relaxed was sensitive to a specific set of worst-case planning 
assumptions, which assumed that measures could not be sustained until an effective 
treatment, vaccine, or contact tracing system was implemented. These assumptions 
dominated strategic planning up to 16 March. As soon as modellers relaxed one of 
those pessimistic assumptions and made room for hope of a vaccine, as in Ferguson 
et al. (2020), the strategic picture changed.
It might be objected that an imperative to consider a wide range of possible sce-
narios, including more optimistic ones, makes more sense in normal times than in 
extremis. Would considering a wider range of scenarios not simply have led to even 
more delays, and potentially to unfounded optimism? I accept that the scientific 
advisers were not in a position to assign precise probabilities or values to different 
scenarios, and were therefore not in a position to do an expected utility calculation 
or cost–benefit analysis. However, I do not think an inability to assign probabilities 
removes the obligation to consider a wide range of scenarios.
Even without assigning probabilities to scenarios, we can look for policies that 
deliver acceptable outcomes robustly (under a wide range of parameter values), as 
opposed to policies that deliver acceptable outcomes only under very specific cir-
cumstances. One natural suggestion, then, is that advisers should only recommend 
actions that robustly lead to acceptable outcomes across all realistic scenarios (see 
e.g. Bradley & Bright, 2020; Bradley & Roussos, 2021). Yet this may be asking too 
much in this context. From SAGE’s point of view, there was a wide range of scenar-
ios in which maximally aggressive suppression leads to an unacceptable outcome, 
i.e. a devastating epidemic when measures were relaxed. This happens robustly in 
models in which there is no place for a vaccine, an effective treatment, effective con-
tact tracing, or long-lasting behavioural change. The problem is not that this result 
was particularly fragile with respect to the variables actually being modelled, but 
that it was dependent on potential game-changers (i.e. the possibility of a vaccine, 
effective treatment or effective contact tracing becoming available and/or long-last-
ing behavioural changes being instilled) that were not modelled at all—and could 
not realistically be modelled within the approaches being used except as sudden, 
exogenous changes to the infection fatality rate (IFR) or reproductive rate (R) of the 
virus.
It may be tempting to say: in that case, what is needed is robustness across a 
wide range of models that includes potential game-changers. The problem with this 
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suggestion is that game-changers can cut both ways. There are also scenarios in 
which the IFR or R rate is suddenly increased by new variants of the virus evolving, 
and in some of those unfortunate scenarios we might regret our failure to build up 
a degree of herd immunity when we had the chance.9 There is no principled rea-
son for including positive game-changers in the model while excluding negative 
game-changers.
There is a deep problem here. Robustness across game-changer-free scenarios is 
not enough in a pandemic, but asking for policies that are robustly acceptable across 
all game-changer scenarios is asking the impossible. A choice has to be made as 
to which game-changers we want our planning to be robust against and which we 
do not, and here too it seems that momentous mixed judgements are unavoidable. 
In keeping with the conclusions of Sect. 4, I take it to be permissible for advisers 
to make these judgements: in extremis, we can tolerate the accountability problem 
this creates. However, these judgements, when made by advisers, should be com-
municated as clearly as possible to decision-makers so that they can be challenged if 
necessary.
This leads me to a fourth proposal: when making a normatively heavy recommen-
dation, scientific advisers should highlight, as part of their advice, the scenarios in 
which their recommended actions would lead to serious regret. For example, they 
should communicate which potential game-changers they have chosen to set aside 
when looking for robustly acceptable policies.
For example, a recommendation to close schools should highlight that, if the frac-
tion of asymptomatic infections turns out to be very high, such that herd immunity 
has already been reached, children would suffer a great harm for no public health 
benefit. Such warnings should then be contextualized, with (for example) an expla-
nation of why betting on the fraction of asymptomatic infections being so high 
would be an extraordinary bet. Likewise, when SAGE recommended a “high trans-
mission reduction” strategy over maximally aggressive suppression, it should have 
highlighted, in a contextualized way, the potential for this strategy to lead to serious 
regret—in the form of tens of thousands of excess deaths which could in retrospect 
have been prevented by pursuing a more aggressive suppression strategy at an ear-
lier stage. Political leaders who are given a clear recommendation, together with a 
contextualized explanation of scenarios in which the recommendation would lead 
to serious regret, can make a decision about whether the risk of serious regret is 
acceptable to them or not.
9 Avian influenza viruses often evolve in a way that increases their pathogenicity. As Akhtar (2012, p. 
106) notes, “All avian influenzas start off as mild, low-pathogenic viruses. However, once they enter 
domestic bird populations, they can rapidly mutate into highly pathogenic viruses.” Once a respiratory 
virus enters a large population of close-packed individuals, it is under selection for reproducing fast 
and being emitted fast by its host—not selection for sparing its host’s life. For discussion of the relevant 
selection pressures, see Sober (2020).
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7  Summary of proposals
Before the epilogue, let us pause to review the proposals of the preceding sections:
1. Scientific advisers may permissibly make normatively heavy recommendations, 
including simple, unambiguous imperatives to implement a specific policy option, 
where they have a justified belief that this option is the only robust way to avert 
a catastrophic outcome.
2. The globally pessimistic scenario (a scenario at the pessimistic end of scientific 
opinion regarding all of its assumptions, not just some) should be used in pref-
erence to a reasonable worst-case scenario (RWCS) when what is desired is a 
general indication of how bad things could, in principle, become.
3. But neither the globally pessimistic scenario nor the RWCS should dominate 
strategic planning. Strategic planning should consider a wide range of possible 
scenarios and look for policies that lead to robustly acceptable outcomes, with-
out relying on the (dangerous) assumption that policies which are optimal in the 
RWCS will successfully avoid disastrous outcomes in less severe scenarios.
4. When making a normatively heavy recommendation, scientific advisers should 
communicate (with context) information about scenarios in which acting on their 
recommendation would lead to serious regret. For example, they should commu-
nicate which potential game-changers they have chosen to set aside when looking 
for robustly acceptable policies.
The proposals are intended to be at the right level of generality to be, I hope, rel-
evant to the management of future crises. To evaluate whether they do generalize in 
a useful way, I want to move forward in time—to September 2020.
8  Epilogue: September 2020
In the autumn of 2020 and the subsequent winter, the UK experienced a second 
major epidemic. One could argue that the virus never went away, but there was a 
marked lull in the summer months, followed by a resurgence. This gives us a chance 
to revisit the themes of this article—the normative force of advice and the role of 
reasonable worst-case scenarios—in a new context.
Let us first consider the normative force of advice. On 21 September, as cases 
rose, SAGE offered the government a “shortlist” of non-pharmaceutical interven-
tions (SAGE, 2020a). The shortlist consisted of “a circuit-breaker (short period of 
lockdown) to return incidence to low levels”; “advice to work from home for all 
those that can”; “banning all contact within the home with members of other house-
holds (except members of a support bubble)”; “closure of all bars, restaurants, cafes, 
indoor gyms, and personal services (e.g. hairdressers)”; and “university and college 
teaching to be online unless face-to-face teaching is absolutely essential” (SAGE, 
2020a). SAGE commented that “a package of interventions will need to be adopted 
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to reverse this exponential rise in cases” and added that “a consistent package of 
measures should be adopted which do not promote, or appear to promote, contradic-
tory goals” (SAGE, 2020a). I see this advice as a compromise between normatively 
light and normatively heavy: a borderline case. A very general course of action is 
recommended, but options are deliberately left open, leaving many substantially dif-
ferent ways to follow the recommendation.
A single item from the shortlist (advice to work from home) was in fact imple-
mented (see Cabinet Office, 2020). A package of measures was put together, but 
none of the other elements of the package were drawn from SAGE’s shortlist, and 
they were all clearly less radical interventions (e.g. attendance at weddings was lim-
ited to 15 people, down from 30). So, the government did indeed implement “a con-
sistent package”, but the consistent package largely overlooked SAGE’s suggestions, 
and did not succeed in bringing R below 1.
I contend that a single, unambiguous recommendation would have been permis-
sible here, for the same reason it was appropriate on 16 March: the situation was 
again one of grave emergency, and conditions (a)–(c) of Sect. 4 were again satisfied. 
Recommending the immediate implementation of all the measures on the shortlist 
would have left the government with a simple choice: implement the recommended 
measures, or be seen to manifestly ignore its own scientific advisers. This would 
have made implementation of sufficient measures more likely. By framing their 
advice in a disjunctive way, SAGE made it easier for the government to evade this 
choice by implementing a “consistent package” that was, foreseeably, insufficient to 
bring R below 1.
Meanwhile, RWCSs have continued to play a major role in planning. A new 
RWCS was drawn up in the summer and was confidential until leaked to The Spec-
tator on 29 October and subsequently officially released (SAGE, 2020m). The new 
RWCS was not globally pessimistic, and was in some respects strikingly optimistic. 
In particular:
The scenario models incidence continuing as per current trends until the end 
of July 2020, with all non-household contacts assumed to be constant with 
current levels. Incidence is then assumed to double once by the end of August 
2020, and double again during the first two weeks of September. At this point, 
social contacts are reduced that reduce R to approximately 1, keeping infec-
tion levels steady until the end of October. Two-week doubling times return 
throughout November (i.e. incidence quadruples through November), after 
which policy measures are put in place to reduce non-household contacts to 
half of their normal pre-March 2020 lockdown levels, while all schools con-
tacts are assumed to be maintained. These measures are sustained until the end 
of March 2021. (SAGE, 2020m, italics added)
In other words, the RWCS assumes that unspecified but highly effective measures 
will be taken by the government in mid-September to bring R to approximately 1. It 
is remarkable to see such an assumption feature in a reasonable worst-case scenario. 
Did scientific advisers really regard this as a reasonable worst-case?
It seems that advisers had significantly less independence from other areas 
of government when constructing the new RWCS, in comparison with the first 
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RWCS. In the spring, SAGE had set the assumptions of the RWCS. In the sum-
mer, by contrast, the RWCS was the result of negotiation with ministers:
This profile of increasing incidence to the end of November 2020, was 
agreed by SPI-M-O co-chair in collaboration with SAGE and Cabinet 
Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat and COVID-19 Taskforce. No spe-
cific assumptions as to what these measures may be were made. (SAGE, 
2020m)
This comment leaves the role of ministers rather opaque. This is partly 
because the command structure at this time was also somewhat opaque. In place 
of COBR, two new committees, COVID-S and COVID-O, were created, with 
responsibility for decisions regarding strategic and operational planning, respec-
tively (this is explained by the Secretary of State for Health in STSC, 2020b). 
I take it that at least one of these new committees was involved in agreeing 
the RWCS, and a SPI-M–O consensus statement from 16 September notes that 
“the RWCS agreed with ministers assumed that policy interventions would be 
made in mid-September to halt the rise in infections” (SPI-M–O, 2020b, italics 
added).
On 3 November, Vallance explained the process to the Science and Technol-
ogy Select Committee in a way that seemed to further marginalize the role of 
scientific expertise: “We model what the Civil Contingencies Secretariat sees 
as a reasonable worst case and that is then modelled by the SPI-M modellers” 
(STSC, 2020c, Q1510).
So the government once again adopted a RWCS that was excessively optimis-
tic in some respects—specifically, it was excessively optimistic about the gov-
ernment’s own actions. Effective measures were not taken in mid-September and 
cases continued to rise throughout October, leading to a national lockdown at 
the end of October. Although preferable to an unmitigated epidemic, this was 
a tragic outcome: the immense amount of resources invested in tracking early 
warning signs of a major epidemic, via an immense mass testing operation, did 
not translate into a swift and effective policy response when those warning signs 
were observed.
This highlights a different potential pitfall of RWCS-centred planning. An 
effective pandemic response can be hindered if planning assumptions are negoti-
ated between scientific advisers and political actors, with political actors influ-
encing the projected values of fundamental epidemiological parameters, such as 
R. Clear limits need to be set regarding which aspects of modelling political 
actors can and cannot influence.
To be clear, the lesson is not that policy-makers should have no input at all. 
What is needed is a clear framework for separating reasonable input (e.g. a 
description of the interventions they are willing to implement) from unreason-
able input (e.g. an assertion that the unspecified interventions, whatever they 
may be, will have a particular epidemiological effect). It is not appropriate for 
political leaders to insist that planning assumptions for a “worst case” build in 
optimistic assumptions about their own actions.
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9  Conclusion
I see the case of September 2020 as providing further support for some of the pro-
posals I put forward earlier in relation to January-March 2020. The events of Sep-
tember reinforce the point that situations of grave emergency may call for clear, 
direct recommendations from advisers that are not overly disjunctive. They also 
underline the danger of relying too heavily on a single set of planning assump-
tions which, while pessimistic in many respects, may also be too optimistic in some 
respects. My hope is that the proposals summarised in Sect.  7 can generalize to 
other pandemics, and other major crises, and that, if enacted, they would lead to bet-
ter advisory and decision-making processes.
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